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Abstract
Are voters’ attitudes towards corrupt candidates affected by the details they learn about
candidates’ wrongdoing? This study examines the effect of including different pieces of
information emphasising the public costs or private gain of a similar corruption incident
on the probability of support for the incumbent mayor’s re-election. I use three surveys
experiments with online convenience samples of Brazilian subjects. The survey experi-
ments use various vignettes presenting a fictitious Brazilian incumbent mayor with
antecedents of misuse of public funds, running for re-election. I manipulate the details
that subjects learn on those antecedents to assess whether information on the public
costs of the corruption incident or on the candidate’s illicit enrichment stimulates a
stronger rejection. Additional manipulations are used to test rival hypotheses. Results
consistently show that information showing the candidate’s illicit enrichment drives a
stronger negative response than every alternative treatment.
Resumen
Influyen los detalles que los votantes conocen sobre los actos de corrupcio´n de un
candidato en su probabilidad de apoyarlo? Este trabajo examina el efecto que tiene
incluir detalles sobre los costos pu´blicos, enriquecimiento ilı´cito y otras formas de
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comportamiento inmoral en la probabilidad de apoyo para su reeleccio´n. Para ello,
utilizo tres experimentos-encuesta con muestras de conveniencia online con partici-
pantes de Brasil. Utilizo varias vin˜etas mostrando un candidato a alcalde ficticio de
Brasil con antecedentes de mal uso de fondos pu´blicos, compitiendo por su reeleccio´n.
Esos antecedentes son manipulados para evaluar si la informacio´n sobre los costos
pu´blicos del acto de corrupcio´n o si la informacio´n sobre el enriquecimiento ilı´cito del
candidato generan un mayor rechazo. Incluyo otras manipulaciones para someter a
prueba hipo´tesis rivales. Los resultados muestran consistentemente que la informacio´n
sobre el enriquecimiento ilı´cito del candidato genera un rechazo mayor que cualquier
otro tratamiento alternativo.
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Introduction
In recent years, a growing number of studies have investigated the conditions that affect
voters’ reactions towards corrupt candidates. This has been the focus of many experimental
and observational studies, including an initiative to support field experiments across various
developing countries.1 These studies have emphasised the importance of a host of mediators,
such as subjects’ identification with the accused candidate’s party (Anduiza et al., 2013),
subject’s identification with the candidate’s position on specific issues (Rundquist et al.,
1977), the degree of party system polarisation (Eggers, 2014), and the role of information
provided by the media and oversight agencies (Banerjee et al., 2014; Botero et al., 2015;
Chang et al., 2010; Costas-Pe´rez et al., 2012; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Palau and Davesa,
2013; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2013, 2017). The role of information has been tackled by
various experimental papers, which found that voters differentiate between credible versus
non credible information (Botero et al., 2015; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2017).
Several of these studies (Ferna´ndez-Va´zquez and Rivero, 2016; Klasˇnja et al., 2017;
Pereira and Melo, 2015; Weschle, 2016) assess whether voters are willing to condone
corrupt incumbents if the politician provides other material benefits. The underlying
assumption is that voters hold politicians accountable with a self (material) interest
approach; that is, when they assume that their well-being suffers from corruption they are
more likely to punish corrupt candidates, but when they benefit from corruption or from
a corrupt politician, they are less likely to punish the candidate.
For instance, two recent studies find that voters care about the distribute consequences
of corruption. Weschle (2016) uses a survey experiment to assess the effect of informing
subjects that a corrupt incumbent distributed the spoils of corruption – through
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clientelism – versus informing them that corruption was used for his private benefit and
finds that electoral punishment is stronger when subjects learn that corruption was used
for the candidate’s private benefit. Ferna´ndez-Va´zquez and Rivero (2016) find in an
observational study that only mayors who engage in corruption with negative dis-
tributive consequences are punished by voters. Similarly, other studies find that
accountability is mitigated when the candidate brought other side benefits to their
constituents, such as jobs (Klasˇnja et al., 2017), public goods (Pereira and Melo, 2015),
or when the economy is growing (Klasˇnja and Tucker, 2013). In contrast, Winters and
Weitz-Shapiro (2013) find no evidence that a good record of public good provision
reduces punishment towards corrupt incumbents.
This line of research is grounded on an underlying conception of a utilitarian voter
who is willing to condone corruption should he obtain other material benefits. In terms of
the type of moral reasoning which would motivate a behaviour-promoting account-
ability, it assumes that voters primarily rely on consequential type of evaluation; that is,
they weigh the candidate’s malfeasance records specially focusing on the presumed
negative consequences of that act.2 Accordingly, voters are more willing to condone
corruption if the consequences of such malfeasance are not negative, or other candidate’s
records contribute to the public well-being.
In this study, I propose an alternative foundation for the motivation behind voters’
attitudes towards corrupt candidates: that voters reject the candidate’s greed more than
the negative consequences of corruption. According to this hypothesis, voters consider
corruption more as a (negative) candidate trait than as an illicit act bearing negative
consequences for their well-being.
This hypothesis is consistent with various studies that show that candidates’ traits,
such as integrity and trustworthiness, have an important impact on voters’ evaluation
(Fridkin and Kenney, 2011; Funk, 1996). If this theory is correct, then information about
how the candidate sought for himself some particular advantage out of the corruption act
would spur a stronger reaction than any other type of information about the negative
consequences of such act.
This theory implies that voters’ motivation stands closer to a deontological type of
moral reasoning; that is, voters reject more the corruption in itself than the negative
consequences of it. According to the deontological tradition, moral evaluations rely on
an assessment of the morality of the act in itself and by the intent of the actor, more than
on the consequences of such act.3
While the distinction between corruption that benefits the public versus corruption
for self-benefit is relevant to understand public’s motivation, real-world corruption
incidents are rarely schemed to benefit the public, which stands from the very
essence of corruption as an activity that politicians want to hide. Most times, cor-
ruption is associated with negative outcomes – that is, involving public costs – rather
than with positive distributive consequences, as a large number of empirical studies
has shown (see Bardhan, 1997; Olken and Pande, 2012, for a review of findings). The
distinction I propose assumes two alternative – but not exclusive – pieces of infor-
mation on a similar corruption crime trying to reflect the type of information that
typically reaches the public. This alternative distinction, I argue, can help us better
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understand how information accessible to the public in typical corruption cases
affects their behaviour.
Moreover, I argue that information on the public costs and on the private gain is ubi-
quitous in corruption news stories. The media will typically emphasise the side of the story
where the burden of the evidence more heavily relies on. If the accusation is grounded on
proofs of illicit enrichment, then the story will focus more on the private benefit of cor-
ruption. Alternatively, when the evidence relies on proofs of misuse of public funds, such
as over-invoicing, no-bid contracts or evidence that money was diverted from its original
purpose, the story will focus more on the public costs of corruption.
It is true that virtually every episode of corruption involves money misappropriated
from one source – involving a cost for the public welfare – and diverted to a destination
not legally sanctioned, such as an illegal campaign fund or used for illicit enrichment.
However, the study’s underlying assumption is that providing additional information on
only one of these sides will prompt subjects to focus mainly on one of these stimuli. As a
rich body of literature on priming effects shows (Ansolabehere et al., 1993; Iyengar et al.,
1982), by providing additional information on issue, we can assess the effect of that
information on a subject’s response. Hence, the purpose of this research is to assess
whether knowing more about the public costs versus the private gain of a corruption act
spurs a stronger reaction.
To assess the public costs versus private gain hypotheses I use three online survey
experiments – including one pilot study – administered to a convenience sample of
Brazilian subjects. The pre-analysis plan for the two experiments was preregistered
(Avenburg, 2015, 2016). In all studies I use vignettes presenting a hypothetical
incumbent mayor running for re-election with antecedents of misuse of public funds.
Two main treatments are used to test the two main hypotheses of this study. In one, the
vignette provides additional information on the source of misappropriated funds – that
is, from which programmes funds were misappropriated – to emphasise the public
costs of corruption. These costs are made explicit in the second study. An alternative
treatment provides additional information on the destination of those funds; that is, on
the mayor’s illicit enrichment. Additional treatments are used to test rival hypotheses.
Results consistently show that additional information showing the private spoils of
corruption generates a stronger negative response. These findings suggest that corruption
is not an undifferentiated treatment. What citizens think about a politician’s behaviour is
largely a function of what sort of details are revealed (generally through the media) about
that behaviour. More specifically, when they learn details about how a corruption scheme
is used for the politician’s personal benefit their rejection of that candidate will be stronger.
The findings have important implications both for the scholarly literature and for
assessments of the effect of corruption on public opinion at large. Regarding the former,
the findings provide suggestive evidence that corrupt candidates receive a stronger
punishment when corruption is perceived as a candidate’s trait – that is, as a result of his
greed – than when perceived as a crime bearing negative consequences for the public. In
terms of the implications for assessments of the impact of corruption scandals on public
opinion, these results imply that corruption news articles focusing on such aspects as
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illicit enrichment by politicians will generate a stronger public reaction than articles
covering other aspects of corruption.
In the next section, I discuss the public costs versus private gain distinction, discuss its
relevance for our understanding on the motivation behind electoral accountability and
for our assessment of information on corruption scandals on public opinion. I also
present the two main hypotheses. The following sections present the pilot study and each
of the two experiments, describe their design, the rival hypothesis tested, and analyse
their results. In the conclusions, I discuss the findings and their implications.
Public Costs and Private Gain in Corruption News
Typical corruption schemes can be seen as a sequence involving private benefits (from
which voters are excluded) and public costs (which voters suffer).4 Both aspects can
presumably trigger voters’ negative response: public costs (as it assumes costs on voters’
welfare) and private gain. Emphasis on private gain doesn’t necessarily involve public
costs but might invoke other moral reactions of unfairness (i.e. illicit enrichment) and
lack of trust on the candidate.
A full corruption story often contains information both on the source where the money
was misappropriated from and on where those funds were diverted. When these types of
stories are available, the public reaction will respond to a combination of all the details
contained in the story. However, not always the news coverage of corruption schemes shows
both aspects of the story. The focus of media reports will depend on where the burden of the
evidence is grounded. While a very solid investigation could serve the press to portray a
complete scheme from end to end – that is, from where the funds misappropriated were
obtained to where they were diverted – often information disproportionately focuses on one
of these sides. Different cases of corruption generate different types of news, covering
different details of the story, which, I argue, will affect differently public opinion.
I propose a twofold categorisation on the type of information available in press reports
based on its hypothesised impact on public opinion: (1) information focusing on the
private benefit – for the official – of corruption, which reflects a piece with more
information on the destination of diverted funds and (2) information focusing on the
public costs – for the community – of a corruption incident, which is often present when
the story focuses on the origin of those funds.5 There are three main reasons why this
distinction, I argue, contributes to the extant literature.
The first reason is that the public costs versus private gain distinction offers a cate-
gorisation on the type of information in real-world news that typically reaches the public
and, hence, contributes to our assessment on the impact of corruption scandals on public
opinion. While the categorisation wasn’t built from a systematic coding of the type of
information available in a sample of real-world corruption scandals, I use two sources to
defend its relevance.
First, it is partially based on a sample of news articles on corruption scandals in
Brazilian municipal politics that were used to build the experimental vignettes in a
realistic fashion, following the typical format of news in Brazilian journals. In Appendix
11, I present this sample of news articles covering municipal corruption in Brazil. A total
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of 21 news articles were selected with that end using a Google search specifically geared
towards identifying municipal corruption incidents that did not necessarily reached a
national audience.6 The search attempted to identify typical lower level corruption
incidents which subjects could find similar to those they could potentially encounter in
their own municipalities. In that appendix, the articles are classified depending on
whether the information emphasises the public costs or private gain of corruption.
Second, I present a number of examples of recent major corruption scandals in Latin
America to show how different scandals can be thought as providing more information
on the public costs, private gain, or a combination of both.7 In November 2014, a
Mexican news outlet revealed that President Enrique Pen˜a Nieto was living in a lux-
urious house built by a subsidiary linked to a major construction conglomerate involved
with government contracts. The scandal was known as the “White House” scandal
because of the property the president was enjoying. As can be seen, the focus of the story
was on the house that the president was taking benefit from. While we can assume that
the incident might involve costs for the public welfare, the details of the story, based on
the burden of the evidence, emphasise the private gain side of the story.
In 2005–2006, two major scandals hit Brazilian politics: the Mensala˜o (“Monthly
Payments”) case and the Sanguessugas (“Bloodsuckers”) case. The first was a scheme in
which various members of the PT government offered monthly bribes to allied legislators
in exchange for political support. Evidence showing that legislators were receiving PT
(Partido dos Trabalhadores) monthly bribes is an example of information on the private
benefits of corruption; subsequently, the press reported that the diverted funds might have
originated from state-owned companies’ advertisement budget. This is an example of the
public costs of corruption. The Sanguessugas case involved a scheme of overpayments and
money diversion in public purchases of ambulances; hence, news stories focusing on
overpayments and payments without acquisition of those ambulances show the public
costs of such fraud. More recently, the Petrobras corruption scandal revealed systematic
overpayments in contracts awarded by the main state-controlled oil company, which
seriously affected the company’s value.8 The details revealed in this scandal show the
public costs of the scheme. Another recent major corruption scandal, the Lava Jato,
revealed that many first-ranked politicians in Brazil received illegal funds, which reflects
the private spoils of corruption.
Other corruption scandals reveal both aspects of the story. For instance, in 2014, a
financial crisis at the Honduran Social Security Institute (IHSS), a government-run social
security office, led to various investigations revealing that the crisis was triggered by
systematic misuse of public funds and money diversion. The public costs side was clear
from the fact that several patients who required assistance from the institute died as a
result of lack of adequate medical supplies and staff. Subsequently, other press inves-
tigations revealed the private gain of the scheme, showing that IHSS officials were living
in luxurious houses and enjoyed an extravagant lifestyle and that part of the diverted
funds were used for illicit campaign funding for the ruling National Party. A similar
corruption scandal with deadly results took place in Guatemala in May 2015, when an
investigation found that the Guatemalan Social Security top managers had received
bribes to purchase faulty medical supplies, which ultimately led to several deaths.
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Various other scandals involved the use of illegal campaign donations, which conveys
a personal benefit for the candidates receiving such donations, although not necessarily
used for illicit enrichment. This was the case of various scandals that took place in Chile
in 2014–2015 involving tax evasion and illicit campaign funding.9
The second reason why the public costs versus private gain is relevant is that it
contributes to our understanding on the type of motivation that prompts a stronger
accountability by assessing whether voters rely on a consequential assessment of the
consequences of corruption or, alternatively, focus on the benefit that the corrupt poli-
tician sought for himself. As previously explained, an important line of inquiry in this
research agenda is based on the assumption of a utilitarian voter willing to condone
corruption if the costs of corruption are not perceived. This article shows an alternative
foundation that can stimulate a stronger reaction.
The last reason is that this distinction is also relevant for other experimental studies on
corruption and accountability. When scholars use vignettes to describe a corrupt can-
didate’s records, they often need to convey additional information on the public costs or
on the private benefits of corruption. For instance, Chong et al. (2015) in a field
experiment distribute leaflets informing on the amount of funds that mayors spent in a
corrupt manner and their responsibility in terms of public goods provision – which
suggests the costs of a corrupt administration. Similarly, in their experimental study
Banerjee et al. (2010: 20) prime subjects on the costs of corruption by telling them:
“Corrupt politicians steal money set aside for development funds and do nothing for
you.” In contrast, other experimental treatments include information on the politician’s
illicit enrichment (Botero et al., 2015) or information on bribe taking, which also
emphasises the private benefit of corruption (Banerjee et al., 2014; Klasˇnja and Tucker,
2013; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2017; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013, 2016).
Results presented in this study suggest that this additional information could moderate
the treatment effect.
The proposed classification doesn’t imply that private costs and private gain are
mutually exclusive in corruption schemes. As can be seen in Appendix 11, often the
two aspects are shown in typical corruption news stories. However, it is analytically
relevant to distinguish the effect of each of these aspects for a number of reasons. First,
as previously stated, it is not uncommon that only one of these sides is reflected in a
scandal. Hence, an estimate of the average effect of each of these pieces of information
on subjects’ opinion can be used to estimate which type of scandal will convey a
stronger public reaction. Second, even if both aspects are reflected, often one of these
sides is more pre-eminent in the story and will be the focus of the headline and more
attention will be devoted to it. Therefore, the side of the story that is most salient in the
news will affect subjects’ judgement on this issue. Third, oversight agencies have often
more institutional resources and expertise in gathering information that would make
the evidence of a prospective incident rely on one of these aspects. Audit Courts will
often collect more evidence that exposes the public costs of corruption, in particular
when they focus on such crimes as over-invoicing, no-bid contracts and other types of
non-efficient uses of public funds. In contrast, inquires that focus on inconsistencies on
elected officials’ statements of assets, or major global investigations of non-declared
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assets – such as the Panama Papers scandal – will focus on the private gain side of the
story.
The two main hypotheses of this study can be summarised as follows:
Public Costs (Hypothesis 1): Voters’ rejection for a corrupt candidate will
increase as they learn additional details about the costs of such misappropriation.
Private Gain (Hypothesis 2): Voters’ rejection for a corrupt candidate will
increase as they learn additional details emphasising the private gain that the
candidate obtained from the misappropriation of public funds.
Pilot Study
The design of the two studies described in this article came out from the results of a pilot
study, where a somehow related hypothesis was tested with null results. In this pilot study, I
tested the hypotheses that accountability is moderated by information on the type of budget
from where funds were misappropriated from and by information on where those funds were
diverted. In particular, I hypothesised that when subjects learn that funds misappropriated
were taken from expenditures that do not directly benefit the public – funds that were
originally destined to repair computers in a municipal offices – they will be more willing to
accept the corrupt candidate than when they learn that those funds were misappropriated
from public health expenditures that directly benefit the public. A second hypothesis
inquired whether different types of information on the destination of misappropriated funds
– illicit enrichment versus illicit campaign expenditures – affect voters’ likelihood to accept
the corrupt candidate. Vignettes presented a fictitious incumbent mayor running for
re-election with antecedents of misuse of public funds. The alternative vignettes varied the
information on the source of misappropriated funds and on the destination of those funds.
The two alternative sources and two alternative destinations of misappropriated funds were
combined in a 2 2 factorial design. I introduced a control condition (where subjects were
informed that the candidate had no antecedents of irregularities) and a baseline condition
(where subjects were informed that the candidate had antecedents of irregularities, but no
further details on the source and destination of misappropriated funds were presented). In
total, six vignettes were presented; the complete wording is presented in Appendix 1.
The pilot study’s design was similar to the two subsequent studies, using Facebook
ads to recruit subjects. Instead of the two screeners used in the two other studies, only one
was used in the pilot study. It was run between August and September 2015. In total
1,598 subjects completed the survey, and a total of 774 subjects passed the single screener
used for the pilot study (48.4% of the total sample). Results showed no support for either of
the two hypotheses. In Appendix 10, results are displayed using ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression analysis. None of the conditions shows a statistically significant dif-
ference, except for the difference between the baseline condition – where subjects learn
that the candidate has corrupt antecedents, but no other information on the source or
destination of misappropriated funds is provided – and all other vignettes that display any
type of information on the source of these funds and on the destination of these funds.
78 Journal of Politics in Latin America 11(1)
The difference between the baseline condition and all other vignettes with further
information on the source and destination of the misappropriated funds provided the
basis for the two studies presented in this article. In particular, the first study inquires
whether the stronger effect is explained by the information on the source of the mis-
appropriated funds or on the destination of those funds. When information about the
source of the misappropriated funds is provided, subjects have some insight on the type
of budget that is being defunded and, hence, are primed on the public costs of the cor-
ruption incident. When information about the destination of those funds is provided,
subjects have an idea of how corruption is used for the benefit of the candidate, hence
conveying an idea of the private gain of the incident. Consequently, the two studies
presented here are used to test the public costs versus private gain hypotheses.
First Study
Following Samuels and Zucco (2012), I recruited subjects online with Facebook
advertisements that avoided any reference to politics, to attract a wider sample of sub-
jects. The ads targeted Brazilian users over the age of 18, offering the chance to win an
iPad after completing a survey. Participants clicking on the ad were redirected to an
external website that presented the consent form and hosted the survey.
All vignettes presented a hypothetical incumbent mayor with antecedents of cor-
ruption who is running for re-election. Following Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2017), I
asked subjects to imagine they live in a different municipality where this mayor is
running for re-election and informed them that since he has been in office, the overall
conditions in the municipality improved, with new public works completed and
improved street cleaning and public transport. The vignette stated that the candidate is
still very popular and has good chances of being re-elected (the exact vignette wording is
available in Appendix 1). Because I was interested in comparing evaluation across
different candidates who have corruption records, I used positive information on prior
records, aside from the corruption records themselves. The purpose of providing a
positive reference point was to allow a relatively high benchmark from which the
negative evaluation point of the corruption record would presumably drop, hence
allowing enough variation in the dependent variable.
The corruption treatment was provided by informing subjects that the State Audit Court
examined how the candidate used public funds and detected irregularities such as over-
invoicing and no-bid public purchases and rejected the candidate’s accounts (which is the
regular procedure of Brazilian Audit Courts detecting severe irregularities). In Brazil, State
Audit Courts have an extensive role in auditing accounts of officials at the municipal level
(Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Melo et al., 2009; Pereira and Melo, 2015), and prior research has
found that they are viewed as a credible source of accusation (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters,
2017). The vignettes added that despite the Audit Court’s decision, the candidate was
allowed to run for re-election (in Brazil candidates with accounts rejected are not allowed
to run, but they often circumvent this restriction by appealing in the judiciary).
To test the two main hypotheses I provided subjects with additional details empha-
sising either the public costs or the private benefits of the corruption incident. To test the
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public costs hypothesis, I used a vignette that included additional details on the source of
the misappropriated funds. The vignette informed subjects that those funds were origi-
nally destined to improve the quality of public hospitals. The treatment emphasised the
costs of the corruption incident in a key area, as public health is one of the main concerns
for Brazilians, according to opinion polls.10 To test the private benefit hypothesis I used a
vignette that informed subjects that diverted funds were destined to a mayor’s bank
account. Each treatment included specific details of the accusation to test rival
hypotheses (described below).
The outcome variable (probability of voting for the mayor) was measured with a
seven-point Likert-type scale. An alternative outcome measure, satisfaction with the
mayor, was also measured using a second seven-point Likert-type scale. I included a
pretreatment questionnaire with several demographic and socio-economic questions,
along with questions measuring subject’s sources of political information, whether he or
she regularly follows political news and discusses politics, whether he or she can
properly identify the role of Audit Courts, and whether he or she attends public or private
hospitals,11 as subjects who regularly use public hospitals could be more sensitive to
information stating that corruption affected public health.
In addition, I included two screener questions. The two screeners were presented as
standard questions with instructions that attempted to measure attentiveness in the last part
of the introductory paragraph (see Appendix 12 for the exact screener wording). As the
vignettes introduced the additional information (on the public costs or private gain of the
incident) in the fourth line of the paragraph, the screener was used to capture subject
treatment compliance assuming equal attentiveness in the screener question and in the
vignette.12 In addition, I measured the time subjects spent reading the treatment vignettes to
test whether those who passed the screeners also spent more time reading the vignette.
Results are presented and discussed both for the entire sample and for the sample that passed
at least one screener. I particularly focus on the results for the sample of most attentive
subjects: those who passed at least one screener. Because the experimental design sought to
capture the effect of various types of additional information introduced in the middle of the
vignettes, results for the sample of most attentive subjects is of particular importance.
Rival Hypotheses
I tested a set of three alternative hypotheses assessing the role of additional information
on the corruption incident. The first one states that any more extensive information,
regardless of what kind of information it is, reinforces the treatment effect. Conse-
quently, any vignette that provides additional information will provide a stronger
reaction, even if this information doesn’t include details on the source or destination of
misappropriated funds. According to this hypothesis, more information means a stronger
treatment (by providing a stronger treatment dosage). If so, the fact that in the previous
pilot experiment additional information generated a stronger response could be inter-
preted as a result of a reinforced treatment.
The second hypothesis states that information providing specific details about the
accusation generates a stronger effect. Here I rely on prior research, grounded in dual-coding
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theory (Paivio, 1986), which has shown that concrete news has a stronger effect than abstract
news (Prabu, 1998). Plausibly, the additional information that subjects received on the
source and destination of misappropriated funds was making the news more concrete,
creating a “story” out of information that otherwise can be perceived as abstract. To test this
hypothesis I included an additional vignette with more abstract procedural information (the
procedural information condition). When subjects were provided with more information
either on the source of misappropriated funds or where those funds were diverted they got a
real, concrete story, as opposed to those confronted with the abstract procedural treatment.
Consequently, the treatment effect in those cases would be stronger.
Finally, I included a third hypothesis that focuses on the often insuficient background
information that subjects have on the role of Audit Courts. I posit here that subjects in the
exploratory experiment used the additional information on the source and destination of
misappropriated funds to interpret what a negative audit means, which not all subjects
might completely understand. To test this hypothesis, the procedural information condition
provided additional information on the role of the Audit Court. Only abstract information
was provided to accommodate hypothesis # 2. In particular, this hypothesis was tested with
the sample of subjects who were less knowledgeable of the role of Audit Courts.
Vignette Design
The baseline treatment informed subjects that the Audit Court found irregularities and
consequently decided to reject the mayor’s accounts. The procedural details treatment
added information on the role of the Audit Court as well as information on the session
and chamber of the Audit Court that decided to reject accounts (all information that is
frequent in news articles). The public costs version was similar to the baseline, with
additional information that the irregularities included over-invoicing and no-bid contracts
in expenditures intended to build a primary healthcare centre. The private benefits treat-
ment was similar to the baseline condition, with additional information that the Audit
Court found that the mayor created a civil association to divert public funds to his own
bank account. I used the Audit Court as the agency that investigates diversion of funds,
though in Brazil this crime is more often investigated by the regular court system, to avoid
varying the institution making the accusation. Presumably, subjects are more familiar with
the procedures of the regular court system than with those of the Audit Court system. If so,
introducing two different institutions might bias comparisons across groups.
Summarising the four treatment conditions:
Tr1 Baseline: Information that the candidate has accounts rejected by the Audit Court.
Tr2 Procedural: Baseline plus information on the Audit Courts procedures and
mechanisms leading to that decision.
Tr3 Healthcare: Baseline plus information that misappropriated funds came from a
programme to build a primary care health centre.
Tr4 Bank Account: Baseline plus information that funds misappropriated were
diverted to the mayor’s bank account.
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Hypotheses and Expected Results
Private Gain (H1): When voters learn additional details about where money was
diverted to, they are less likely to support a corrupt candidate than when they learn
additional details on the source of misappropriated funds.
Expected results (H1): Support for candidate in Tr4 < support for candidate in
Tr3, Tr2, and Tr1.
Public Costs (H2): When voters learn additional details about the source of mis-
appropriated funds, they are less likely to support a corrupt candidate than when
they learn additional details about where funds were diverted.
Expected results (H2): Support for candidate in Tr3 < support for candidate in
Tr4, Tr2, and Tr1.
Specific Details (H3): When voters learn specific details of the accusation, they
are less likely to support a corrupt candidate.
Expected results (H3): Support for candidate in Tr4 ¼ Tr3 < Tr2 ¼ Tr1.
Procedural Information (H4): When voters learn more about the procedures of
the Audit Court, they are more likely to understand and believe in the accuracy of
the accusation and hence less likely to support a corrupt candidate. The effect is
expected to be higher for the subset of subjects who did not answer correctly a
question on knowledge of Audit Courts’ role.
Expected results (H4): Support for candidate in Tr2 < Tr3 ¼ Tr4 ¼ Tr1.
Any kind of information (H5): When the treatment includes more information (of
any kind), voters are less likely to support a corrupt candidate.
Expected results (H5): Support for candidate in Tr4 ¼ Tr3 ¼ Tr2 < Tr1.
Results
The experiment was run between November and December 2015. In total, 4,894 subjects
responded to the survey. A total of 1,506 subjects passed at least one screener question
(31 per cent of respondents) and a total of 701 subjects passed both screeners (14 per cent
of respondents). The experimental sample is largely representative, although individuals
with lower levels of education are under-represented. The sample also shows a larger
share of women. Both patterns are consistent across the two studies (sample descriptive
statistics are presented in Appendix 2).
The under-representation of the least educated subjects is consistent with prior studies
using recruitment with Facebook advertisements in Brazil (Boas, 2014; Samuels and
Zucco, 2012) and can be arguably attributed to the fact that this population has a lower
rate of Internet usage. According to a 2016 study carried out by the Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics (IBGE), only 29.5 per cent of the least educated segment of the
population – those with primary school incomplete or less –regularly use Internet. In
contrast, 91.2 per cent of Brazilians with high school completed or more have a regular
access to Internet (IBGE, 2016). To assess whether results for the entire sample are
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consistent with those of the subsample of the least educated subjects in Appendix 8 I run
a similar analysis for those who have incomplete high school education or less. Results
are discussed below in this section.
In terms of time spent on the vignette’s screen, subjects who passed at least one
screener spent an average of 88.6 seconds, while subjects who did not pass any screener
spent an average of 79.1 seconds. Subjects who passed the two screeners spent an
average of 89 seconds. This suggests that subjects who passed screeners did spend more
time reading the vignettes.
In Table 1, I present results from the OLS models. Results are displayed using
baseline as the reference category. As can be seen across the six columns, results fully
support the private gain hypothesis. In all columns, the bank account condition shows the
strongest negative effect. As we can see in Appendix 7, several covariates (age, edu-
cation, income, ideology, and frequency of political conversation) significantly predict
probability to pass screener. Therefore, in columns 2-6 additional covariates are included
to control for imbalances (see results of a multinomial logistic model testing sample
balance in Appendix 3). In columns 2 and 3, I control for education, income, and gender,
and in column 4, I include a knowledge of Audit Courts role dummy as control. All
results fully support the private gain hypothesis. The effect size ranges from a decline in
9 percentage points in columns 1, 3, and 4 (with respect to the baseline condition) to a
decline in 7 percentage points in column 2. The fact that the interaction with the Audit
Court dummy is not significant (in column 5) suggests no support for the procedural
information hypothesis. The interaction with the public hospital dummy (in column 6) is
not significant, suggesting no support for the public costs hypothesis.
In Appendix 4, I report mean vote intention for each treatment condition for subjects who
passed at least one screener. Table 5A in Appendix 5 shows results of difference-in-means
tests with vote intention as dependent variable for subjects who passed at least one screener.
Results using both Holm adjusted p values (for multiple hypotheses tests) and non-adjusted
p values show that subjects in the bank account condition are significantly less likely to
support the candidate as compared to all other conditions. In addition, these results also show
that subjects in the healthcare condition are significantly less likely to support the candidate
than subjects in the baseline and procedural conditions. When shifting the dependent
variable to satisfaction with mayor (Table 5B) only the bank account condition shows
significant differences with the other conditions. Results using the entire sample (displayed
in Appendix 6) also provide strong support for the private gain hypothesis.
In Table 9A in Appendix 9, I use various interactions to assess whether the effect
varies across subjects with different background conditions. In particular, I interact the
various treatments with an ideology variable that measures in a 0–10 point scale whether
the individual self-identifies from far-left (0) to far-right (10); a 1–5 point scale variable
capturing whether the individual regularly follows the news, which goes from never (1)
to always (5); a 1–5 point scale variable capturing whether the individual regularly talks
about politics, which goes from never (1) to always (5); and two dummies indicating if
subject self-identifies with one of the two main parties: the PT or the Partido da Social
Democracia Brasileira (PSDB). There is an interesting interaction between ideology and
bank account: as we go to the far-right in the ideology spectrum, individuals seem to be
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more information sensitive to the bank account information. However, the same inter-
action shows no significant results in the second study. Therefore, it is unclear to what
extent this result is generalisable.
In Appendix 8, I assess whether these results are consistent when considering only the
under-represented population of the least educated subjects. Results are consistent with the
larger population. Subjects in the bank account condition – as well as subjects in all other
conditions – are less likely to support the candidate than those in the baseline condition.
In sum, overall results in study 1 fully support the private gain hypothesis.
Table 1. OLS Regression on Vote Intention (Study 1).
Screener
(1 or 2)
All
Subjects
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Procedural 0.02
(0.12)
0.19**
(0.08)
0.05
(0.12)
0.07
(0.13)
0.06
(0.19)
0.27
(0.19)
Healthcare 0.32***
(0.12)
0.24***
(0.08)
0.36***
(0.12)
0.37***
(0.12)
0.11
(0.19)
0.39**
(0.19)
Bank account 0.63***
(0.13)
0.48***
(0.08)
0.63***
(0.13)
0.64***
(0.13)
0.46**
(0.20)
0.86***
(0.19)
Education 0.06***
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.02)
Income 0.01
(0.01)
0.03
(0.28)
0.04
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
Sex 0.06
(0.06)
0.14
(0.16)
0.11
(0.10)
0.13
(0.10)
0.09
(0.10)
Knowledge Audit Court 0.28***
(0.09)
0.34*
(0.19)
0.28**
(0.09)
Public hospital 0.10
(0.18)
Procedural  Audit Court 0.22
(0.25)
Healthcare  Audit Court 0.46
(0.25)
Bank Account  Audit Court 0.31
(0.26)
Procedural  Public Hospital 0.33
(0.25)
Healthcare  Public Hospital 0.08
(0.25)
Bank Account 
Public Hospital
0.40
(0.26)
Intercept 2.55***
(0.09)
3.16***
(0.14)
2.64***
(0.24)
2.79***
(0.25)
2.61***
(0.27)
3.08***
(0.29)
N 1,506 4,894 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,506
Note: Baseline is the reference category. Standard errors are represented in parentheses. Sex is coded as
female ¼ 1 and male ¼ 0. OLS ¼ ordinary least squares.
***p < .01.
**p < .05.
*p < .1.
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Second Study
Results of the first study showed that more information on the candidate’s illicit
enrichment drives a stronger punishment effect. The purpose of the second study is
twofold. First, the bank account and healthcare vignettes were modified to make them
more homogeneous. In the first study, those vignettes included specific stories on the
corruption episodes found out by the Audit Court to accommodate its format to the one of
typical real news and as a test for the specific details versus abstract news hypothesis. The
trade-off is that as different forms of specific stories are developed, other details of the
story besides the treatment itself might have an impact on the outcome of interest. In this
new experiment, those conditions are displayed in more homogeneous vignettes, without
developing concrete stories, so that other background conditions are kept similar.
Second, a new vignette is included to assess whether the finding that voters care more
about the private benefits of corruption than about the consequences of it can be used to
generalise a theory about how subjects weigh corruption antecedents. As previously
explained, the fact that subjects reject more strongly the personal use of public funds
supports the idea that corruption is weighed more as a candidate trait than as an act
bearing negative public consequences and is consistent with a deontological idea of
morality, in which the judgement focus more on the act in itself than on the consequences
of it. To assess whether this finding can be used to generalise a theory about account-
ability, I use a new treatment that primes subjects on the lack of candidates’ trust-
worthiness: this is the lying treatment. In this new treatment, subjects are informed that
the candidate lied to the Audit Court to cover-up the irregularities in his use of public
funds. This new treatment is also consistent with the idea of corruption as a candidate trait,
as subjects receive more information on the candidate’s faulty behaviour but not on the
consequences of such behaviour. Consequently, if the theory that subjects consider cor-
ruption as a candidate trait is valid, then we should be able to generalise the theory finding
a similar treatment effect in both the private gain and in the lying vignettes, as in both cases
the candidate attempted to deceive voters and oversight institutions, either by using a
scheme to divert money or by lying to the Audit Court to conceal the irregular use of public
funds. In contrast, if subjects are particularly concerned with the elected officials’ illicit
enrichment, we should still detect a stronger effect in the bank account vignette.
In addition, I increased the negative stimulus of the public costs vignette as a harder
test for the private gain hypothesis. The new stimulus made explicit the costs associated
with the misuse of funds by informing subjects that as a consequence, the primary care
health centre couldn’t be finished.13
Experimental Design
The experiment was run in January 2016. The recruitment method was similar to the one used
in the first study, with one modification. To avoid repeated survey takers, I used a Facebook
pixel that identified and prevented showing the ad to users who completed the pilot and first
surveys. In addition, I set the survey in the same Qualtrics platform that was used in study 1; the
survey was set to prevent retaking the survey (as consequence subjects who completed study 1
who attempted to complete for the first time study 2 would be considered retakers). Finally, I
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included a question asking subjects whether they took a similar survey during the months that
the two previous experiments (including the pilot study) were being run.
The baseline vignette was identical to the one used in study 1, with only one modification,
that is, it included the information that irregularities included over-invoicing and no-bid
contracts and that misappropriated funds came from a healthcare programme. That means
that the new baseline condition had more information than the baseline condition in study 1.
A second vignette included the information that the candidate lied to the Audit Court when
justifying expenses (lying condition). A third vignette included the information that because
of the misuse of funds, the primary care centre was not built (public costs condition). A
fourth vignette included the information that the candidate diverted the misappropriated
funds to his own bank account (bank account condition). I included the same screeners used
in study 1. The four treatment conditions can be summarised as follows:
Tr1 Baseline: Information that misappropriated funds come from a healthcare
programme.
Tr2 Lying: Baseline plus information stating that the mayor lied when justifying
expenses.
Tr3 Public Costs: Baseline plus information that as a result of the misuse of funds, the
primary care centre was not built.
Tr4 Bank Account: Baseline plus information that the misappropriated funds were
diverted to the mayor’s bank account.
Hypotheses and Expected Results
Trustworthiness (H1): Support for a corrupt candidate drops as subjects learn
additional details emphasising the candidate’s moral misbehaviour (lying or
diverting funds to his bank account).
Expected results (H1): Support for candidate in Tr2 ¼ Tr4 < Tr1 and Tr3.
Private Gain (H2): Support for a corrupt candidate drops specifically when sub-
jects learn details about his illicit enrichment.
Expected results (H2): Support for candidate in Tr4 < Tr1, Tr2 and Tr3.
Public Costs (H3): Support for a corrupt candidate drops as subjects learn addi-
tional details about the programme from which funds were misused and on the
specific costs of that mismanagement.
Expected results (H3): Support for candidate in Tr3 < Tr1, Tr2 and Tr4.
Results
A total of 4,918 subjects completed the survey. After dropping 563 subjects who had
taken one of the previous surveys, the final number of respondents is 4,355. Subjects who
passed at least one screener spent on average 100 seconds reading the treatment vignette,
while subjects who failed to pass any screener spent an average of 90 seconds. Subjects
who passed both screeners spent an average of 103 seconds reading the vignette. This
suggests, again, that screener passage is a good indicator of treatment compliance.
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In Table 2, I present results of the OLS analyses. The baseline condition is the reference
category. Results, again, fully support the private gain hypothesis. In the first column I
present results using the sample that passed at least one screener without controls. Subjects
in the bank account condition are significantly less likely to support the candidate than
subjects in the baseline condition. The bank account is the only condition that shows a
statistically significant negative effect. Results from the sample of all candidates (column
2) present similar results. Results displayed in columns 4 and 5 (with the subsample that
passed the screener using additional controls) also fully support the private gain hypoth-
esis. The magnitude of the effect ranges from an almost 5 percentage point decline in the
probability of voting for the mayor (in columns 1, 3, and 4) to an almost 3 percentage point
decline (in column 2). The relative decline in the magnitude of the effect with respect to
study 1 is probably a result of the additional information provided in the baseline
Table 2. OLS Regression on Vote Intention (Study 2).
Screener
(1 or 2)
All
Subjects
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Lying 0.09
(0.12)
0.07
(0.08)
0.11
(0.12)
0.10
(0.11)
0.01
(0.17)
Costs 0.09
(0.12)
0.09
(0.08)
0.11
(0.12)
0.11
(0.12)
0.04
(0.17)
Bank Account 0.31***
(0.12)
0.19**
(0.08)
0.33***
(0.12)
0.33***
(0.12)
0.29*
(0.17)
Education 0.03**
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.00)
0.06***
(0.02)
0.06***
(0.02)
Income 0.05***
(0.02)
0.07***
(0.00)
0.07***
(0.03)
0.06**
(0.03)
Sex 0.07
(0.21)
0.01
(0.83)
0.00
(0.08)
0.01
(0.08)
Audit Court Knowledge 0.16*
(0.09)
0.15*
(0.09)
Public Hospital 0.03
(0.17)
Lying  Public Hospital 0.19
(0.24)
Costs  Public Hospital 0.12
(0.24)
Bank Account  Public
Hospital
0.07
(0.23)
Intercept 2.15***
(0.08)
2.74***
(0.14)
2.81***
(0.22)
2.93***
(0.23)
2.86***
(0.27)
N 1,538 4,355 1,538 1,538 1,538
Note: Baseline is the reference category. Standard errors are represented in parentheses. Sex is coded as
female ¼ 1 and male ¼ 0. OLS ¼ ordinary least squares.
***p < .01.
**p < .05.
*p < .1.
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condition. In the last column I include the interactions with the public hospital dummy. In
this analysis, the difference between the bank account condition and the baseline condition
is not significant (at the .05 level) and the interaction is not significant. This is the only
model, though, where the difference is not significant at the .05 level.
Table 5C in Appendix 5 presents results for the difference-in-means test for subjects who
passed at least one screener. Results also fully support the private gain hypothesis as the
difference between this condition and all other conditions is significant (with both Holm-
adjusted p values and with non-adjusted p values). No other significant differences are
observed. Table 5D presents results of similar analyses using satisfaction with the mayor as
dependent variable (for the subsample that passed the screener). These results also provide
full support for the private gain hypothesis (although the difference with the baseline and
with the lying conditions are not significant when using the Holm-adjusted p values).
Table 9B in Appendix 9 shows the results for various interactions. None of these terms
is statistically significant. Table 8B in Appendix 8 displays results for the subsample of
least educated subjects. Here, the difference between the bank account condition and the
baseline condition is not statistically significant at conventional levels. However, the
coefficient sign is in the expected direction, and the pool of the least educated subjects in
this study (n ¼ 982) is relatively smaller than the one in the first study (n ¼ 1,393).
Conclusions
This study provides consistent evidence that subjects respond differently to similar
corruption incidents depending on the type of information they receive. That is, they are
particularly sensitive to information involving illicit enrichment. Results are robust even
when increasing the stimulus of the main rival hypothesis (public costs) with more
salient information on the public costs of the corruption incident (in study 2).
These results suggest that holding politicians to account is not grounded on a self-
interested estimation of the costs of corruption, as much of the previous literature sug-
gests. They show that a rejection of the candidate’s greed is a stronger stimulus to punish
corrupt politicians. However, the theory cannot be extended to affirm that any type of
behaviour that shows that the candidate is not trustworthy prompts a similar effect. As
suggested by the results of the second study, greed is a stronger prompt than knowing
that the candidate lied to the Audit Court. This means that in subjects’ evaluation of
corrupt candidates, their judgement is grounded on a conception that considers that the
public office should never be used for illicit enrichment. Corruption is viewed more as a
candidate’s trait than as a malfeasance bearing negative consequences, and the candi-
date’s greed is perceived as the worst offence.
This study also points out to new possible avenues for studies on accountability by
linking the type of information that is typically present in corruption news articles with
the subjects’ reactions towards corrupt candidates. This avenue has obvious implications
for our assessment of how corruption scandals affect voting behaviour, as subjects
typically learn about these scandals through the press. While a more systematic content
analysis of a pool of corruption news articles is warranted to assess how real news on
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corruption affect public opinion, results presented in this study show a possible classi-
fication which has proved to affect differently subjects’ responses.
We should note, however, that all vignettes presented incumbent mayors who had positive
backgrounds records in a number of areas. A limited interpretation of this study, therefore, is
that the findings are only valid for the cases of candidates with good records (outside of the
corruption incident). That is, voters might be more information sensitive to public costs when
incumbents show worse background records. Whether information sensitivity varies across
this or other dimensions of candidacy could be tested in future research.
These findings have important repercussions as we interpret the political consequences
of corruption scandals. They suggest that when the evidence of corruption is grounded on
proofs of illicit enrichment, the effect of such a scandal on public opinion will be stronger.
In contrast, when the information is grounded on proofs that show the public costs of
corruption, such as unfinished public works, the impact on public opinion will be weaker.
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Notes
1. EGAP Metaketa Initiative on Political Accountability in the Developing World. See: http://
egap.org/metaketa/metaketa-information-and-accountability.
2. The consequentialist and deontological ethical conceptions are two major traditions in the
field of ethical theory. For a survey of the consequentialist traditions, see Brink (2006); for a
survey of the deontological traditions, see McNaughton and Rawling (2006).
3. See note 2.
4. This is implied in the classic definition of corruption which refers to a misuse of public office
(or entrusted power) for private gain, insofar as we assume that the misuse of public office
presumes public costs.
5. Here, I am considering in particular corruption cases in which public funds are misappropriated.
An alternative to this could be a case of a bribe, where the origin of the funds is private. In this
case, while the costs for the community are still present, public money is not being directly.
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6. The keywords used for the Google search were “Corruption,” “Audit Courts,” “Accounts
Rejected,” “Mayor,” and “Municipality.” The search was conducted in various days during
the months of April, May, June, July, September, and October 2015 and January 2016.
7. This brief summary is based on Casas-Zamora and Carter (2017).
8. See: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/business/international/effects-of-petrobras-scan
dal-leave-brazilians-lamenting-a-lost-dream.html?mcubz¼0 (accessed 25 August 2017).
9. In particular, a scandal associated with Penta, one of the largest financial conglomerates,
revealed that top managers were involved in systematic tax evasion, bribery, and money laun-
dering. The investigation also found that illicit funds were partially used for illegal campaign
funding to the conservative party Independent Democratic Union (UDI). A similar scandal hit
the Sociedad Quı´mica y Minera de Chile S.A., one of the world’s biggest producers of fertilisers
and lithium. The group provided illicit campaign funding to eight political parties.
10. See http://www.ibope.com.br/pt-br/noticias/Paginas/Brasileiro-elege-saude-seguranca-e-edu
cacao-como-prioridades-para-2014.aspx. (accessed 21 April 2015).
11. Specifically, the question asked subjects whether the last time they went to a hospital they
attended a public or a private hospital.
12. Berinsky et al. (2014) contend that subjects can be assumed to pay equal attention across an
entire questionnaire. Following their recommendation I present both results for all subjects
and for the sample of subjects who passed the screener question.
13. It is not uncommon to see similar real cases, in particular when the municipal government
depends on federal transfers for education or health-related expenses. In those cases, when
federal audits detect irregularities, the federal government will stop transfers. See the example
number 10 in Appendix 11 for a similar case in real news.
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Appendix 1
Vignettes
Pilot Study Vignettes
Vignette 1. Imagine that you were living in another municipality of Brazil similar to
the one in which you currently live and that current the mayor in this municipality is
running for re-election. Since he has been mayor, conditions in his municipality have
significantly improved. He completed new public works, and the street cleaning has
significantly improved. The State Audit Court examined how he used public funds and
concluded that there were no irregularities in his use of public funds.
Vignettes 2–6. Imagine that you were living in another municipality of Brazil similar to
the one in which you currently live and that the current mayor in this municipality is
running for re-election. Since he has been mayor, conditions in his municipality have
significantly improved. He completed new public works, and the street cleaning has
significantly improved. The State Audit Court examined how he used public funds and
concluded that there were many irregularities such as purchases without bidding and
over-invoicing (in funds spent to improve the quality of public hospitals/in funds spent in
technical services for maintenance of computers in several municipal offices/ [OR
NOTHING]). Subsequent investigations of the State Audit Court showed that funds
were diverted (to the mayor’s bank account/ to benefit members of the mayor’s party
who worked with him in the electoral campaign/ [OR OMIT THIS LINE]).
First and Second Study Vignettes. Imagine that you were living in another municipality
of Brazil similar to the one in which you currently live and that the current mayor in this
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municipality is running for re-election. The State Audit Court examined how he used
public funds when he was mayor and concluded that there were many irregularities and
consequently rejected his accounts [Insert 1/ Insert 2/ Insert 3/ Insert 4].
Despite the decision, the candidate was allowed to run for re-election. The candidate
is still very popular and has good chances of being re-elected. Since he was elected,
conditions in the municipality have significantly improved. As mayor he completed new
public works, improved street cleaning, as well as the quality of public transport.
First Study. Insert 1 (Baseline): [Nothing]
Insert 2 (Procedural): The decision to reject accounts was made by the first chamber
of the Audit court, the agency in charge of auditing the use of public funds. The
investigation determined that the use of public money was not in conformity with the
principles established by law.
Insert 3 (Healthcare): The investigation of the Audit Court showed irregularities in the
use of resources destined for a healthcare programme. The Court determined that the mayor
is responsible for over-invoicing in hiring a company to build a primary care health centre
and for non-bidding in a purchase of material that was intended to be used for this centre.
Insert 4 (Bank Account): Subsequent investigations of the State Audit Court showed
that funds were diverted to a mayor’s bank account. According to the investigation, the
mayor created a civic association through which he signed a contract used to divert
public funds to his own bank account.
Second Study. Insert 1 (Baseline): The investigation of the Court showed that the mayor
is responsible for over-invoicing and no-bid purchases in funds that were intended to
build a primary care health centre.
Insert 2 (Lying): The investigation of the Court showed that the mayor is responsible for
over-invoicingand no-bid purchases in funds that were intended to build a primary care health
centre. The Court also showed that the mayor lied when he testified that he did the required
bid for various purchases as several of the alternative budgets he presented were faked.
Insert 3 (Costs): The investigation of the Court showed that the mayor is responsible
for over-invoicing and no-bid purchases in funds that were intended to build a primary
care health centre. The Court also showed that as a consequence of those irregularities
the primary healthcare centre could not be finished.
Insert 4 (Bank Account): The investigation of the Court showed that the mayor is
responsible for over-invoicing and no-bid purchases in funds that were destined to build
a primary care health centre. The Court also showed that the over expenses and no-bid
purchases were used by the mayor to divert part of those funds to his own bank account.
Follow-Up Questions (Common for the Two Studies)
How likely would you vote for a candidate like this?
Not at all o o o o o o o Very likely
How satisfied would you feel with a mayor like this?
Not at all satisfied o o o o o o o Very satisfied
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Appendix 2
Sample Descriptive Statistics
Table 2A. All Subjects.
Study 1 Study 2 Census
Household income
0–2  minimum wage 48.0 44.1 38.5
2–5  minimum wage 30.2 30.9 36.4
5þ  minimum wage 15.1 17.7 25.1
No response 6.7 7.3
Region
North 3.9 4.1 7.4
Northeast 16.2 16.0 26.6
Centre West 6.7 7.4 7.3
Southeast 49.2 47.5 43.8
South 14.9 14.5 14.9
No response 9.1 10.5
Education (18 years old or older)
Primary incomplete or less 9.6 8.2 45.1
Primary complete or secondary incomplete 18.9 16.4 16.6
Secondary complete or tertiary incomplete 45.8 43.1 27.9
Tertiary complete 25.6 32.3 10.0
No response 0.1 0.1
Other
Age (median) 30 31 38
Male 29.5 34.2 48.2
Note: Experimental sample descriptive statistics and 2010 Brazilian National Census (IBGE) statistics.
Table 2B. At Least One Screener.
Study 1 Study 2 Census
Region (NA omitted)
North 4.7 4.0 7.4
Northeast 13.6 13.9 26.6
Centre West 6.8 7.6 7.3
Southeast 50.4 49.3 43.8
South 17.3 16.1 14.9
No response 7.2 9.0
Education (18 years old or older)
Primary incomplete or less 2.8 2.7 45.1
Primary complete or secondary incomplete 11.8 8.5 16.6
Secondary complete or tertiary incomplete 48.6 43.7 27.9
Tertiary complete 36.8 45.2 10.0
No response 0.1 0.0
Other
Age (median) 31 33 38
Male 30.0 38.0 48.2
Note: Experimental sample descriptive statistics and 2010 Brazilian National Census (IBGE) statistics.
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Appendix 3
Balance Across Treatment Groups
Table 2C. All Subjects.
Study 1 Study 2 Americas Barometer
Party
None 77.0 75.9 77.1
PT 5.3 6.2 12.1
PSDB 4.4 4.9 2.4
PMDB 3.2 3.1 3.9
Other 10.1 9.8 4.5
Note: Experimental sample descriptive statistics and 2012 Americas Barometer by the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP) sample descriptive statistics.
Table 2D. At Least One Screener.
Study 1 Study 2 Americas Barometer
Party
None 79.0 77.0 77.1
PT 5.2 6.3 12.1
PSDB 5.0 5.6 2.4
PMDB 1.8 2.1 3.9
Other 9.1 9.1 4.5
Note: Experimental sample descriptive statistics and 2012 Americas Barometer by the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP) sample descriptive statistics.
Table 3A. Multinomial Logistic Regression: At Least One Screener (Study 1).
Procedural Healthcare Bank account
Education 0.00 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
Income 0.02 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05)
Gender (Male) 0.13 (0.16) 0.03 (0.16) 0.14 (0.17)
Knowledge Audit Court 0.12 (0.27) 0.23 (0.15) 0.02 (0.15)
Intercept 0.37 (0.39) 0.25 (0.39) 0.10 (0.40)
N (Total ¼ 1,506)
Note: Standard error in parentheses. Baseline is the reference category.
Table 3B. Multinomial Logistic Regression: At Least One Screener (Study 2).
Lying Costs Bank account
Education 0.15 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.08 (0.04)
Income 0.11** (0.04) 0.07 (0.04) 0.02 (0.05)
Gender (Male) 0.12 (0.15) 0.04 (0.16) 0.14 (0.15)
Knowledge Audit Court 0.01 (0.15) 0.10 (0.15) 0.01 (0.15)
Intercept 0.48 (0.38) 0.24 (0.38) 0.43 (0.38)
N (Total ¼ 1,538)
Note: Standard error in parentheses. Baseline is the reference category.
**p < .05.
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Appendix 4
Mean Vote Intention
Appendix 5
Replication of Results with ANOVA: At Least One Screener
Table 4A. Mean Vote Intention: At Least One Screener (Study 1).
Baseline Procedural Healthcare Bank account
2.55 (1.83) 2.54 (1.76) 2.23 (1.69) 1.92 (1.58)
n ¼ 381 n ¼ 381 n ¼ 384 n ¼ 360
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. DV ¼ likelihood to vote for candidate.
Table 4B. Mean Vote Intention: At Least One Screener (Study 2).
Baseline Lying Costs Bank account
2.15 (1.68) 2.25 (1.72) 2.24 (1.65) 1.84 (1.44)
n ¼ 397 n ¼ 380 n ¼ 371 n ¼ 386
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. DV ¼ likelihood to vote for candidate.
Table 5A. Estimated Difference in Vote Intention (One-Way ANOVA; Study 1).
Procedural Healthcare Bank account
Baseline 0.02 (0.90) [0.90] 0.32 (0.04) [0.01] 0.63 (0.00) [0.00]
Procedural 0.31 (0.04) [0.01] 0.62 (0.00) [0.00]
Healthcare 0.31 (0.04) [0.02]
Bank account
N (Total ¼ 1,506) 381 384 360
Note: p values in parentheses represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment; p values in square
brackets represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment. ANOVA ¼ analysis of variance.
Table 5B. Estimated Difference in Satisfaction with Mayor (One-Way ANOVA; Study 1).
Procedural Healthcare Bank account
Baseline 0.03 (0.81) [0.81] 0.22 (0.15) [0.05] 0.69 (0.00) [0.00]
Procedural 0.20 (0.17) [0.08] 0.66 (0.00) [0.00]
Healthcare 0.46 (0.00) [0.00]
Bank account
N (Total ¼ 1,506) 381 384 360
Note: p values in parentheses represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment; p values in square
brackets represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment. ANOVA ¼ analysis of variance.
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Appendix 6
Replication of Results with ANOVA (All Subjects)
Table 5C. Estimated Difference in Vote Intention (One-Way ANOVA; Study 2).
Lying Costs Bank account
Baseline 0.09 (1.00) [0.42] 0.09 (1.00) [0.46] 0.31 (0.03) [0.00]
Lying 0.01 (1.00) [0.95] 0.41 (0.00) [0.00]
Costs 0.40 (0.00) [0.00]
Bank account
N (Total ¼ 1,538) 380 371 386
Note: p values in parentheses represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment; p values in square
brackets represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment. ANOVA ¼ analysis of variance.
Table 5D. Estimated Difference in Satisfaction with Mayor (One-Way ANOVA; Study 2).
Lying Costs Bank account
Baseline 0.02 (1.00) [0.89] 0.05 (1.00) [0.67] 0.25 (0.10) [0.02]
Lying 0.06 (1.00) [0.57] 0.24 (0.12) [0.03]
Costs 0.30 (0.04) [0.01]
Bank account
N (Total ¼ 1,538) 386 380 371
Note: p values in parentheses represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment; p values in square
brackets represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment. ANOVA ¼ analysis of variance.
Table 6A. Estimated Difference in Vote Intention (One-Way ANOVA; Study 1).
Procedural Healthcare Bank account
Baseline 0.18 (0.04) [0.02] 0.25 (0.01) [0.00] 0.48 (0.00) [0.00]
Procedural 0.07 (0.39) [0.39] 0.30 (0.00) [0.00]
Healthcare 0.24 (0.00) [0.00]
Bank account
N (Total ¼ 4,894) 1,260 1,224 1,177
Note: p values in parentheses represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment; p values in square
brackets represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment. ANOVA ¼ analysis of variance.
Table 6B. Estimated Difference in Satisfaction with Mayor (One-Way ANOVA; Study 1).
Procedural Healthcare Bank account
Baseline 0.25 (0.00) [0.00] 0.27 (0.00) [0.00] 0.63 (0.00) [0.00]
Procedural 0.11 (0.87) [0.87] 0.38 (0.00) [0.00]
Healthcare 0.39 (0.00) [0.00]
Bank account
N (Total ¼ 4,894) 1,260 1,224 1,177
Note: p values in parentheses represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment; p values in square
brackets represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment. ANOVA ¼ analysis of variance.
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Appendix 7
Probability to Pass Screener
Table 6C. Estimated Difference in Vote Intention (One-Way ANOVA; Study 2).
Lying Costs Bank account
Baseline 0.06 (0.58) [0.47] 0.08 (0.58) [0.29] 0.20 (0.04) [0.01]
Lying 0.14 (0.25) [0.07] 0.15 (0.25) [0.06]
Costs 0.29 (0.00) [0.00]
Bank account
N (Total ¼ 4,355) 1,054 1,041 1,043
Note: p values in parentheses represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment; p values in square
brackets represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment. ANOVA ¼ analysis of variance.
Table 6D. Estimated Difference in Satisfaction with Mayor (One-Way ANOVA; Study 2).
Lying Costs Bank account
Baseline 0.16 (0.12) [0.03] 0.03 (1.00) [0.65] 0.19 (0.04) [0.01]
Lying 0.12 (0.25) [0.08] 0.04 (1.00) [0.57]
Costs 0.16 (0.11) [0.02]
Bank account
N (Total ¼ 4,355) 1,054 1,041 1,043
Note: p values in parentheses represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment; p values in square
brackets represent a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment. ANOVA ¼ analysis of variance.
Table 7A. Probability to Pass Screener (Study 1).
One screener Two screeners
Education 0.05*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00)
Age 0.01** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Sex 0.02 (0.21) 0.01 (0.35)
Income 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Ideology 0.01** (0.04) 0.01 (0.58)
Frequency of political conversation 0.04*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00)
Frequency of news following 0.01 (0.20) 0.01 (0.50)
N 4,894 4,894
Note: Standard errors are represented in parentheses. All results from logistic regression. Sex coded as
female ¼ 1, male ¼ 0. Ideology is measured in a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right).
***p < .01.
**p < .05.
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Appendix 8
Subsample Analysis for the Least Educated Subjects
Table 7B. Probability to Pass Screener (Study 2).
One screener Two screeners
Education 0.04*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00)
Age 0.01** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Sex 0.03** (0.02) 0.04*** (0.01)
Income 0.02*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00)
Ideology 0.00 (0.00) 0.00* (0.00)
Frequency of political conversation 0.04*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
Frequency of news following 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.88)
N 4,355 4,355
Note: Standard errors are represented in parentheses. All results from logistic regression. Sex coded as
female ¼ 1, male ¼ 0. Ideology is measured in a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right).
***p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
**p < .05 (two-tailed tests).
*p < .10 (two-tailed tests).
Table 8A. OLS Regression on Vote Intention: Least Educated Subsample (Study 1).
All subjects All subjects
Procedural 0.55*** (0.16) 0.55*** (0.16)
Healthcare 0.40*** (0.16) 0.36** (0.16)
Bank account 0.59*** (0.16) 0.60*** (0.16)
Sex 0.23 (0.13)
Intercept 3.04*** (0.11) 3.41*** (0.25)
N 1,393 1,393
Note: Baseline is the reference category. Standard errors are represented in parentheses. Sex coded as
female ¼ 1 and male ¼ 0; subjects with less than high school completed. OLS ¼ ordinary least squares.
***p < .01.
Table 8B. OLS Regression on Vote Intention: Least Educated Subsample (Study 2).
All subjects All subjects
Lying 0.02 (0.18) 0.05 (0.18)
Costs 0.33* (0.18) 0.30* (0.18)
Bank account 0.31* (0.18) 0.27 (0.18)
Sex 0.23 (0.13)
Intercept 2.37*** (0.11) 3.41*** (0.25)
N 982 982
Note: Baseline is the reference category. Standard errors are represented in parentheses. Sex coded as
female ¼ 1 and male ¼ 0; subjects with less than high school completed. OLS ¼ ordinary least squares.
***p < .01.
*p < .10.
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Appendix 9
OLS Regression Analyses with Interactions
Table 9A. OLS Regression on Vote Intention (Study 1).
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Procedural 0.12
(0.26)
0.08
(0.62)
0.23
(0.44)
0.05
(0.12)
0.03
(0.13)
Healthcare 0.10
(0.12)
0.07
(0.63)
0.19
(0.44)
0.36***
(0.13)
0.37***
(0.13)
Bank account 0.12
(0.27)
1.09*
(0.64)
0.32
(0.46)
0.62***
(0.13)
0.62***
(0.13)
Education 0.06***
(0.02)
0.05***
(0.02)
0.05***
(0.02)
0.06***
(0.02)
0.06***
(0.02)
Income 0.03
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
0.03
(0.03)
0.03
(0.02)
Sex 0.06
(0.06)
0.12
(0.10)
0.12
(0.10)
0.14
(0.10)
0.13
(0.10)
Ideology 0.04
(0.03)
News following 0.14
(0.10)
Political Talks 0.10
(0.09)
Party PT 0.43
(0.43)
Party PSDB 0.06
(0.41)
Procedural  Ideology 0.03
(0.04)
Healthcare  Ideology 0.05
(0.04)
Bank Account  Ideology 0.09**
(0.04)
Procedural  News Following 0.03
(0.14)
Healthcare  News Following 0.10
(0.15)
Bank Account  News
Following
0.11
(0.15)
Procedural  Political Talks 0.05
(0.12)
Healthcare  Political Talks 0.05
(0.12)
(continued)
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Table 9A. (continued)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Bank Account  Political Talks 0.09
(0.13)
Procedural  Party PT 0.10
(0.55)
Healthcare  Party PT 0.05
(0.60)
Bank Account  Party PT 0.35
(0.64)
Procedural  Party PSDB 0.28
(0.57)
Healthcare  Party PSDB 0.23
(0.62)
Bank Account  Party PSDB 0.21
(0.57)
Intercept 2.46***
(0.30)
3.18***
(0.48)
2.87***
(0.38)
2.61***
(0.25)
2.64***
(0.25)
N 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,506
Note: Baseline is the reference category. Standard errors are represented in parentheses. Sex is coded as
female ¼ 1 and male ¼ 0. Ideology is measured in a 0–10 point scale, from far-left (0) to far-right (10). News is
following coded as 1–5 point scale from never (1) to always (5). Political talk is coded as 1–5 point scale from
never (1) to always (5). OLS ¼ ordinary least squares.
*p < .10 (two-tailed tests).
**p < .05 (two-tailed tests).
***p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
Table 9B. OLS Regression on Vote Intention (Study 2).
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Lying 0.23
(0.24)
0.06
(0.61)
0.21
(0.43)
0.04
(0.36)
0.013
(0.34)
Costs 0.09
(0.25)
0.36
(0.65)
0.29
(0.45)
0.66**
(0.33)
0.16
(0.35)
Bank account 0.63**
(0.24)
0.97
(0.59)
0.26
(0.46)
0.24
(0.34)
0.16
(0.35)
Education 0.06***
(0.02)
0.04**
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.02)
0.12**
(0.05)
0.12***
(0.05)
Income 0.08***
(0.03)
0.06**
(0.03)
0.06**
(0.03)
0.03
(0.06)
0.02
(0.06)
Sex 0.01
(0.09)
0.01
(0.08)
0.01
(0.08)
0.02
(0.21)
0.07
(0.21)
(continued)
Avenburg 101
Table 9B. (continued)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Ideology 0.03
(0.02)
News following 0.23**
(0.10)
Political talks 0.08
(0.08)
Party PT 0.97*
(0.54)
Party PSDB 0.22
(0.51)
Lying  Ideology 0.06
(0.04)
Costs  Ideology 0.01
(0.04)
Bank Account  Ideology 0.05
(0.04)
Lying  News Following 0.12
(0.14)
Costs  News Following 0.11
(0.15)
Bank Account  News
Following
0.15
(0.14)
Lying  Political Talks 0.03
(0.12)
Costs  Political Talks 0.05
(0.12)
Bank Account  Political Talks 0.02 0.12
Lying  Party PT 0.25
(0.68)
Costs  Party PT 1.39**
(0.69)
Bank Account  Party PT 0.11
(0.68)
Lying  Party PSDB 0.35
(0.74)
Costs  Party PSDB 0.58
(0.65)
Bank Account  Party PSDB 0.09
(0.67)
Intercept 2.99***
(0.27)
3.68***
(0.47)
3.01***
(0.36)
2.82***
(0.56)
2.96***
(0.57)
N 1,538 1,538 1,538 1,538 1,538
Note: Baseline is the reference category. Standard errors are represented in parentheses. Sex is coded as
female ¼ 1 and male ¼ 0. Ideology is measured in a 0–10 point scale, from far-left (0) to far-right (10). News is
following coded as 1–5 point scale from never (1) to always (5). Political talk is coded as 1–5 point scale from
never (1) to always (5). OLS ¼ ordinary least squares.
*p < .10 (two-tailed tests).
**p < .05 (two-tailed tests).
***p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
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Appendix 10
OLS Regression Analysis: Pilot Study
Table 10A. OLS Regression on Vote Intention: Pilot Study.
Screener
All
subjects Screener Screener Screener
No corruption 3.37**
(0.20)
2.80***
(0.17)
3.29***
(0.20)
3.29***
(0.21)
2.88***
(0.29)
Healthcare/bank account 0.52***
(0.19)
0.37**
(0.02)
0.57***
(0.19)
0.57***
(0.20)
0.77***
(0.27)
Healthcare/re-election 0.62***
(0.19)
0.42**
(0.01)
0.63***
(0.19)
0.61***
(0.20)
0.69**
(0.28)
Computer/bank account 0.69***
(0.20)
0.43**
(0.01)
0.69***
(0.20)
0.65***
(0.20)
0.61**
(0.28)
Computer/re-election 0.49***
(0.20)
0.37**
(0.17)
0.50**
(0.20)
0.47***
(0.20)
0.55**
(0.28)
Education 0.05**
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
0.02
(0.02)
Income 0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)
Sex 0.01
(0.97)
0.07
(0.13)
0.04
(0.13)
0.02
(0.13)
Knowledge Audit Court 0.13
(0.12)
0.14
(0.12)
Public hospital 0.07
(0.29)
No Corruption  Public Hospital 0.91**
(0.42)
Healthcare/Bank Account  Public
Hospital
0.47
(0.40)
Healthcare/Re-election  Public Hospital 0.22
(0.41)
Computer/Bank Account  Public
Hospital
0.13
(0.41)
Computer/Re-election  Public Hospital 0.18
(0.41)
Intercept 2.11***
(0.14)
2.11***
(0.14)
2.09***
(0.00)
2.17***
(0.00)
2.37***
(0.00)
N 774 1,598 774 774 774
Note: Standard errors are represented in parentheses. Sex is coded as female¼ 1 and male¼ 0. Public hospital¼
1, if subject attends public hospital. OLS ¼ ordinary least squares.
***p < .01.
**p < .05.
*p < .1.
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Appendix 11
Public Costs versus Private Gain in Real News Examples
Accused Public costs Private gain Source
Mayor of
municipality in
the state of
Paraı´ba
Over-invoicing in public
purchases of 66,400
scholar kits.
– See source
reference 1
Mayor of
municipality in
the state of Rio
Grande do Norte
No-bid contracts and money
diversion from an
education programme
Evidence that the money
was diverted for mayor’s
illegal enrichment
See source
reference 2
Mayor, vice-mayor
and various city
council- men in
the state of Piauı´
Money diverted from
programmes to support
public schools
Money diverted benefited
mayor’s relatives with
over-priced salaries
See source
reference 3
Mayor of
municipality in
the state of
Amapa´
– Mayor created fake civil
association to divert
public funds to benefit
himself, relatives and
allies
See source
reference 4
Mayor in
municipality in
the state of Santa
Catarina
Over-priced contracts and
fake bids in expenses for
public works
Diverted funds distributed
among mayor and
participants in the
scheme
See source
reference 5
Mayor in
municipality in
the state of
Alagoas
Money diverted in funds for
public health programmes
– See source
reference 6
Mayor in
municipality in
the state of
Espı´ritu Santo
Money diverted in funds
allegedly used to support
a charity association
Funds were distributed
among mayor and other
participants in the
scheme
See source
reference 7
Mayor in
municipality in
the state of
Maranha˜o
Over-expenses in funds
destined to improve
health conditions in rural
households
– See source
reference 8
Mayor in
municipality in
the state of Sa˜o
Paulo
Over-expenses in contract
for solid waste collection
– See source
reference 9.
(continued)
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Accused Public costs Private gain Source
Two mayors in
municipality in
the state of
Alaogas
Irregular use of funds that
the federal government
transferred to build a
primary healthcare
centre, which wasn’t
completed
– See source
reference 10
Mayor of
municipality in
the state of Matto
Grosso do Sul
Irregularities in contract for
the purchase of food
supplies for schools.
– See source
reference 11
Mayor of
municipality in
the state of Ceara´
_ Evidence that public funds
were diverted for
mayor’s illicit enrichment
See source
reference 12
Mayor of
municipality in
the state of Rio
de Janeiro
_ Money diverted to a
religious organisation for
non-existing services
See source
reference 13
Mayor of
municipality in
the state of Matto
Grosso do Sul
Irregularities in contract for
the purchase of food
supplies for schools
_ See source
reference 14
Mayor in
municipality in
the state of Goia´s
Over-priced expenses in
municipal advertisements
The ads were oriented to
self-promotion
See source
reference 15
Mayor in
municipality in
the state of
Maranha˜o
Funds allocated to improve
school infrastructure
were diverted
Funds diverted to support
mayor’s relatives and
friends
See source
reference 16
Mayor in
municipality in
the state of
Amapa´
Over-priced contracts for
food supply and cultural
activities
Funds were diverted for
self-enrichment
See source
reference 17
Mayor in
municipality in
the state of
Paraı´ba
Diversion of funds originally
destined for public health
– See source
reference 18
Mayor in
municipality in
the state of
Alagoas
Diversion of funds originally
destined for public health
– See source
reference 19
(continued)
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Accused Public costs Private gain Source
Mayor in
municipality in
the state of Sa˜o
Paulo
Irregularities in contract for
thrash collection
– See source
reference 20
Wife of mayor in
the state of
Espı´rito Santo
Diversion of funds originally
destined for charity
– See source
reference 21
Source:
1. “Oposic¸a˜o aponta superfaturamento na compra de kit escolar em S. Jos´e,” G1 Vale do Para´ıba e Regi~ao (24
February 2014). Available at: http://g1.globo.com/sp/vale-do-paraiba-regiao/noticia/2014/02/oposicao-aponta-
superfaturamento-na-compra-de-kit-escolar-em-s-jose.html (accessed 1 July 2015).
2. “Ex-prefeito de Tangara´ Giovannu Ce´sar e´ condenado por fraude e enriquecimento ilı´cito,” Blog do VT,
October 6, 2014. Available at: http://www.blogdovt.com/index.php/14-simples-noticia/5310-ex-prefeito-de-
tangara-e-condenado-por-fraude-e-enriquecimento-ilicito (accessed 1 October 2015).
3. “Prefeito de Passagem Franca e´ Investigado por Desvio de Recursos,” Capital Teresina, 13 March 2015.
Available at: http://www.capitalteresina.com.br/noticias/geral/prefeito-de-passagem-franca-e-investigado-por-
desvio-de-recursos-25963.html (accessed 1 March 2016).
4. “MP-AP Oferta Denu´ncia contra ex-prefeito Roberto Go´es,” Amapa´ 247, 2 September 2014. Available at:
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revelam-megaesquema-de-corrupcao-em-santa-catarina.htm (accessed 22 October 2015).
6. “TCU abre investigac¸a˜o por uso irregular de verba do SUS em Pa˜o de Ac¸u´car,” Repo´rter Alagoas, 31 August
2012. Available at: http://reporteralagoas.com.br/novo/tcu-abre-investigacao-por-uso-irregular-de-verba-do-
sus-em-pao-de-acucar/ (accessed 21 October 2015).
7. “Tribunal de Contas do ES investiga suposto desvio de verba em Colatina,” Diario O Globo, 6 June 2013.
Available at: http://g1.globo.com/espirito-santo/noticia/2013/06/tribunal-de-contas-do-es-investiga-suposto-
desvio-de-verba-em-colatina.html (accesed 10/21/2015).
8. “CGU condena ex-prefeito a devolver R$ 286 mil por irregularidades em conveˆnios,” Itapecuru Noticias, 12
January 2010. Available at: http://www.itapecurunoticias.com/index.php?pag¼noticias&acao¼exibir&id¼880
(accessed 25 October 2015).
9. “Peixoto: Enriquecimento Ilı´cito em Contrato do Lixo, diz MP,” 6 August 2015. Available at: http://gazetade
taubate.com.br/peixoto-enriquecimento-ilicito-em-contrato-do-lixo-diz-mp/ (accessed 25 October 2015).
10. “Ex-prefeitos Cristina Branda˜o e Bida tera˜o que devolver 190 mil aos cofres pu´blicos,” Minuto Serta˜o, 1
March 2012. Available at: http://minutosertao.cadaminuto.com.br/noticia/1929/2012/03/01/ex-prefeitos-
cristina-brandao-e-bida-terao-que-devolver-190-mil-aos-cofres-publicos (accessed 21 October 2015).
11. “Ex-prefeito e´ impugnado em R$ 496 mil e multado em R$ 36 mil,” Dourado News, 1 April 2015. Available at:
http://www.douradosnews.com.br/noticias/politica/ex-prefeito-de-miranda-e-impugnado-em-r-496-mil-
multado-em-r-36-mil/703617/ (accesed 10/1/2015).
12. “Prefeito afastado enfrenta nova acusac¸a˜o,” O Povo, 28 October 2007. Available at: http://
www.deunojornal.org.br (accessed 3 October 2015).
13. “Ex-prefeita tera´ de reembolsar o que pagou a falso conveˆnio,” Revista Consultor Jurı´dico, 7 January 2014.
Available at: https://www.conjur.com.br/2014-jan-07/ex-prefeita-sao-goncalo-reembolsar-verbas-pagas-
entidade-religiosa (accessed 22 October 2015).
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Appendix 12
Screeners
First and Second Study Screeners
First Screener. In the last national elections, candidates talked about different issues,
such as the state of the economy and corruption. Many times candidates talk about their
plans and people do not pay attention. Now we want to see whether you are paying
attention to what you are reading. To show that you are paying attention, ignore the
questions below and choose “None of the above” and “Poverty” as your two answers.
In your opinion, what was the most important issue that candidates debated on during
the last election?
(1) Unemployment
(2) The state of the economy
(3) Crime
(4) Poverty
(5) Inflation
(6) Corruption
14. “Ex-prefeito e´ impugnado em R$ 496 mil e multado em R$ 36 mil,” Dourado News, 1 April 2015. Available at
http://www.douradosnews.com.br/politica/ex-prefeito-de-miranda-e-impugnado-em-r-496-mil-multado-em-
r-36-mil/703617/ (accessed 5 October 2015).
15. “Prefeito de Crixa´s e´ condenado por improbidade administrativa,” Notı´cias de TJGO, 6 August 2015.
Available at: http://www.tjgo.jus.br/index.php/home/imprensa/noticias/162-destaque2/10285-prefeito-de-
crixas-e-condenado-por-improbidade-administrativa (accessed 2 September 2015).
16. “Prefeito de Passagem Franca e´ investigado por desvio de recursos,” Capital Teresina, 13 March 2015.
Available at: http://www.capitalteresina.com.br/noticias/geral/prefeito-de-passagem-franca-e-investigado-por-
desvio-de-recursos-25963.html (accessed 22 October 2015).
17. “MP-AP oferta denu´ncia contra ex-prefeito Roberto Go´es,” Brasil 247, 2 September 2014. Available at:
https://www.brasil247.com/pt/247/amapa247/152142/MP-AP-oferta-den%C3%BAncia-contra-ex-prefeito-
Roberto-G%C3%B3es.htm (accessed 22 October 2015).
18. “Ex-Prefeito de Conde e´ condenado a devolver R$ 300 mil,” PB Agora, 4 May 2015. Available at: http://
www.pbagora.com.br/conteudo.php?id¼20150504151538&cat¼paraiba&keys¼-exprefeito-conde-
condenado-pelo-tcu-tera-devolver-quase-rs$-mil (accessed 25 October 2015).
19. “TCU abre investigac¸a˜o por uso irregular de verba do SUS em Pa˜o de Ac¸u´car,” Reporter Alagoas, n.d.
Available at: http://reporteralagoas.com.br/novo/tcu-abre-investigacao-por-uso-irregular-de-verba-do-sus-
em-pao-de-acucar/ (accessed 25 October 2015).
20. “TCE reprova contrato firmado por Peixoto para coleta do Lixo,” O Vale, 25 June 2015. Available at: http://
www2.ovale.com.br/tce-reprova-contrato-firmado-por-peixoto-para-coleta-de-lixo-1.597800 (accessed 27
October 2015).
21. “MP quer que primeira-dama de Colatina devolva R$ 6 milho¯es,” O Globo, 30 May 2015. Available at: http://
g1.globo.com/espirito-santo/noticia/2013/05/mp-quer-que-primeira-dama-de-colatina-devolva-r-6-
milhoes.html (accessed 21 October 2015).
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(7) Drugs
(8) Education
(9) Health
(10) None of the above
Second Screener. There are many forms in which people receive information about
their municipality. Some persons get their news from the radio, other talking with
neighbours, and other talks with co-workers or classmates. There are also persons who
don’t pay attention to the questions that researchers do. We want to see whether you are
paying attention. To show that you read this, please ignore the question below and just
choose the “–” option at the very bottom of the list.
How do you regularly receive information about the situation in your municipality?
(1) Radio
(2) Newspaper
(3) TV
(4) Talking with neighbours
(5) Talking with family members
(6) Talking with co-workers
(7) Talking with classmates
(8) At Church
(9) Internet websites
(10) Another form
(11) I don’t receive information
(12) –.
108 Journal of Politics in Latin America 11(1)
